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The ubiquitous digitization of information and the pervasive connectivity of work systems have 
inevitably facilitated cyber-enabled industrial espionage. Security failures explain most of cyber 
industrial espionage incidents, and insider threats represent a significant pattern in many case 
examples. Insiders can inadvertently or purposefully pose serious threats to organisations by 
facilitating access to or misuse of proprietary sensitive data. This paper argues that technical security 
solutions have rather limited scope to tackle this problem, and that a socio-technical approach has 
potential to provide a better means to address the challenge of preventing and responding to insider 
threats. Such an approach could bridge the gap between the design and implementation of security 
solutions and creation of an organizational culture that is security aware.     
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Introduction 
Desire for means to gain competitive advantage underpins the nature of most business research. This 
suggests that it is vital for businesses and organisations to anticipate early-warning topics - including 
competitor initiatives, technological innovation, and governmental actions (Lesca and Lesca, 2011). 
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Analysis of such early signs of change is at the core of competitive and/or business intelligence 
activities, allowing organisations to develop proactive and innovative capabilities. However, there 
are increasing issues of concern in relation to certain intelligence gathering practices, at least from a 
legal and ethical point of view, which make the boundaries between competitive intelligence and 
industrial espionage rather blurred (Wright and Roy, 1999). 
The move towards more connected work systems, in which technological developments have 
enabled the movement of a plethora of data over networked systems, has sparked concerns about 
security. Poorly designed and configured work systems might provide a backdoor for internal and/or 
external hackers looking to break into corporate networks.  
Research on security failures has acknowledged the central role of human factors in developing and 
sustaining resilient security capabilities (Alotaibi, Furnell and Clarke, 2016; Soomro, Shah and 
Ahmed, 2016). In particular, employees can pose serious threats to their organisations, either 
inadvertently or voluntarily, by facilitating access to or misuse of proprietary sensitive data.  
A report published by the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI, 2013) states 
that poor management practices and poor communication between business areas have contributed 
significantly to increases in employee disaffection and, in consequence, increased risk of insider 
threats. In addition, a study by PwC and the London School of Business (Global Economic Crime 
Survey, 2016) shows that a “get-tough” approach to the management of performance, as well as a 
rise in blame culture, have created a hostile social climate. This, in turn, leads to an increased 
tendency towards unethical behaviours.  
In this paper, we argue that there are many reasons to explain malicious and non-malicious intent of 
attack, but it is relevant to include among them a lack of understanding of security controls, poor 
communication within organizations and a lack of shared values between employer and employee. 
All of these tensions create cracks that facilitate vulnerabilities. We consider that a socio-technical 
perspective on security may be helpful both to illuminate the causes and facilitators of insider threats, 
and to support design of more secure and resilient work systems. 
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Thus, the aim of this paper is to set out a case for socio-technical approaches to counter cyber 
industrial espionage. In the next section, we consider the nature and scale of this problem. We then 
go on to examine deficiencies in security practice that may contribute towards insider threats, before 
discussing the socio-technical perspective, with practical illustrations. Finally, we attempt to draw 
some conclusions on the application of this perspective in reducing vulnerabilities. 
Nature and scale of cyber-enabled industrial espionage 
Industrial espionage incidents appear in the news on a daily basis. According to the Commission on 
the Theft of American Intellectual Property (IP Commission, 2017), the cost of counterfeit goods, 
pirated software, and theft of trade secrets in the USA could be as high as $600 billion. In particular, 
espionage via hacking costs the US economy $400 billion per year and trade secret theft costs 1% 
and 3% of GDP. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, 2018) estimates the cost 
of cyber-espionage between $10 and $12 billion to USA and $50-$60 billion globally. In the UK, a 
report published by Cabinet Office on the costs of cybercrime suggests that £7.6 billion may be 
attributed to industrial espionage (Cabinet Office/Detica, 2011). 
The 11th edition of the Verizon Data Breach Investigations report (Verizon Data Breach 
Investigations, 2018), based on a dataset of  over 53,000 incidents and 2,216 confirmed data 
breaches, shows that 90% of breaches fall into two main motives: financial gain, followed by 
strategic advantage – or in other words espionage. Phishing and pretexting represent 98% of social 
incidents and 93% of breaches; Email continues to be the most common attack vector over 95% of 
the time; and motives for phishing are split between financial (59%) and espionage (41%). The 
modus operandi of phishing is quite simple and consists of installing malware to enable the theft of 
and/or the access to sensitive and valuable data. The same reports states that 70% of breaches 
associated with nation-state or state-affiliated actors involved phishing. Threat actors attributed to 
state-affiliated groups or nation states combine to make up 93% of breaches, with former employees, 
competitors, and organized criminal groups representing the rest. Unsurprisingly, the sectors that are 
more affected by cyber-espionage are Education and Manufacturing. In the public sector, cyber-
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espionage remains a large concern, with state-affiliated actors accounting for over half of all 
breaches. Interestingly, privilege misuse and error by insiders account for a third of breaches 
(Verizon Data Breach Investigations, 2018). The growing involvement of state actors in targeting 
non-military data was also highlighted in the Ninth Annual Cost of Cybercrime Study recently 
published by Accenture and the Ponemon Institute (Bissell, Lasalle and Dal Chin, 2019). This study 
involved 355 companies across 11 countries and 16 industries and shows that economic espionage, 
such as theft of high-value intellectual property by nation-states, is on the rise. 
The threat of cyber-espionage targets also small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which are 
vulnerable mainly because of insufficient technical and investment capacities to counter cyber-risks. 
The WISKOS research project on industrial espionage in Germany and Europe reveals that one-third 
of Germany's SMEs have been victims of industrial espionage, sabotage or data theft (Carl, 2017). 
The scale of the problem is significant given the SMEs’ importance for an economy. 
It is worthy of mention that many organisations do not know they have been victims, as espionage 
breaches, by their nature, typically take longer to find. In addition, organisations who suffered are 
rather reluctant to report breaches because of concerns about reputation and consequent effect on 
share price. 
From a legal point of view, there are a number of national, regional and international initiatives that 
have been developed to address industrial espionage. Examples of initiatives to protect trade secrets 
against theft in the context of industrial espionage include the EU Directive 2016/943 on the protection 
of undisclosed know-how and business information against unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure; 
and international obligations within the framework of the World Trade Organisation, such as the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.   
However, the implementation of these directives and treaties is rather challenging and problematic 
because of a number of legal issues with enforcement and jurisdiction (see, e.g. Baron and Pigeon, 
2017). In addition, it is difficult to investigate industrial espionage cases when cyber-attacks are used to 
root out sensitive data, as it is often difficult to identify the attackers.  
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Having considered the nature and extent of the problem, in the next section we consider ways in which 
such security breaches are currently facilitated. 
Understanding deficiencies in security practices 
It is clear that designing and developing robust, secure information systems is one line of defence to 
counter cyber-enabled industrial espionage. While there have been significant technological 
advancements and a considerable investment in information systems security, cyber-security 
continues to be a big challenge for businesses and governmental organisations.  
While security risks and financial costs of cybercrime continue to escalate, advances in security 
practice and strategy have not been adequate to keep up with dynamic and challenging attacks (e.g. 
The Global State of Information Security Survey, 2016; Symantec Internet Security Threat Report 
2015; Global Economic Crime Survey, 2016). In particular, enterprises experience difficulties in 
assessing and managing their security risks, applying appropriate security controls that match the 
requirements of their real business processes, and preventing security threats.  
Research in information security has shown that an exclusive emphasis on a technology-centred view 
induces flaws in the design and implementation of security solutions, and this points to the necessity 
of including people and processes as a core part of secure and usable work systems (Baskerville, 
1991; Bednar and Katos, 2009; Siponen and Willison, 2009).  One of the fundamental problems is 
to balance conflicting requirements of security and usability in the context of everyday priorities in 
real world work systems and practices (Sommerville, 2011; Furnell, 2016; Dhillon et al., 2016). 
There are many reasons that can explain conflicts between security and usability, but it is relevant to 
include among them a lack of involvement of professionals with operational knowledge in risk 
assessement and security policy development (Shedden et al., 2011). In order to demonstrate the 
importance and necessity of the contextual dimension in the design of a secure information system, 
the study of Spears and Barki (2010) provides a particular application of this view in the context of 
regulatory compliance and confirms the conclusion that the engagement of users in risk analysis 
process contributes to more effective security measures and better alignment of security controls 
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with business processes. As such, the existence of a security policy does not in itself guarantee its 
effective implementation or, indeed, relevance from the perspectives of those who use organizational 
systems (Dhillon and Torkzadeh, 2006). Applying a critical analysis of security policies, Stahl et al., 
(2012) have advocated that these policies can privilege certain groups of stakeholders, particularly 
managers and IT professionals. There is also a need for management to communicate effectively the 
relevance of security controls to employees who are involved in their implementation in everyday 
work practices (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2010). Consequently, questions about security failures in 
context need to address the relevance of security policies from the perspectives of professional 
stakeholders. In many cases, it has been found that professionals attempting to improve their 
effectiveness will work around security compliance or bypass security measures altogether 
(Albrechtsen, 2007; Koppel et al., 2015; Kolkowska and Dhillon, 2013).  
Sadok and Bednar (2016) conducted a survey involving 33 SMEs in the UK on their approach to 
information security risks. Key findings of this survey indicate that, while there is a wide agreement 
about the importance of security and its potential impact on company performance, understanding 
of security is rather focused on a technology-oriented perspective. However, the actual work 
practices and routines of most employees were either ignored or insufficiently intertwined with 
security management efforts. While security practices may vary by industry and company size, the 
challenge for most SMEs is the integration of security functions into business processes through an 
active engagement of all internal stakeholders in risk analysis and security policy definition. Such 
engagement cannot be approached via top-down managerial instructions and policies, or through 
reliance on the competencies of the IT department or the security specialists. 
In attempting to integrate security measures into business processes and practices, it is important to 
consider meaningful use. While most people engage with information systems to some extent in 
carrying out their work roles, it is a mistake for designers to consider them simply as ‘users’ – few 
of us, if asked what we do at work, would reply that we are users of IS – we are machine operators, 
accountants, surveyors, customer assistants, and so on (Nissen, 2002). It is important that 
professionals’ individual, contextual understandings of their work roles are channelled into design 
practice if appropriate security measures are to be incorporated. Too often, exploration of context of 
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use stops at a consideration for usability factors – what will make the system safe and comfortable 
in use for given, pre-defined purposes. While it is important to achieve a balance between usability 
and security measures, professionals also need opportunities to explore and express what factors will 
render a system useful to them in a context of practice. Checkland and Holwell (1998), make the 
point that not one, but two systems are involved in IS design endeavors – a system to be served (i.e. 
people engaged in activities), and a serving system containing elements which generate data useful 
to those people. When we use the objective term ‘information system’, this tends to focus attention 
on the second of these to the exclusion of the first. However, human agents are required to engage 
with such a system in order to interpret data and transform it into something meaningful to a work 
role or task. It may be preferable to think in terms of ‘informing systems’, i.e. means by which people 
can inform themselves or assist others to do so. People are an essential element in any informing 
system and, of course, it is not possible to design a person. Effective design of an informing system 
requires their involvement and understanding of the process of meaning creation (Bednar and Welch, 
2009). Embedding of appropriate provision to promote security within an informing system must 
therefore involve opportunities to explore the context of meaningful use. 
By failing to appreciate complex relationships between use, usability and usefulness, efforts to 
impose security procedures will not only result in potential for misuse, but are likely to create 
difficulties for work functionality and efficiency (Bednar and Katos, 2009). This, in turn, will create 
incentives to explore short-cuts and work arounds that will constitute new vulnerabilities (Alter, 
2013; Alter, 2017). The weakest link is not necessarily to be found in the technical system, but in the 
difference between the formal model of usage and patterns of real usage of system and content (data) 
in a purposeful activity system. Consequently, designers have to find a balance between security, 
performance and usability (Sommerville, 2011) by involving professionals in shaping system and 
security requirements holistically. IT specialists should also continue to work on security methods 
that minimize inconvenience and delays (Oz and Jones, 2008) that could encourage deviation from 
desired security practice.  
Another important issue is related to the implementation of a security policy. This is expected to 
change organisational procedures and to shape and monitor the behavior of employees, through 
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education and training for compliance. However, documented requirements and general training 
campaigns may have a minimal effect on user behavior and awareness in practice (Parsons et al., 
2014; Bada, Sasse and Nurse, 2015). In the study by Sadok and Bednar (2016), many subjects 
indicated that they had received appropriate training and yet, when asked whether their job roles 
involved consideration of security, answered in the negative. This is in spite of the fact that, for 
instance, breaches of the General Data Protection Regulations can and do lead to individual 
prosecution (Information Commissioner, 2017). 
Having considered the deficiencies that may arise in relation to information systems security 
practice, and some possible causes of these vulnerabilities, we now go on to consider how socio-
technical perspectives may provide a way forward. 
Socio-technical approaches 
The socio-technical systems approach to work design has its origins in work by the Tavistock 
Institute for Human Relations in the period immediately after the Second World War. Emery and 
Trist (Trist, et al, 1997) believed that social sciences could be harnessed to influence the ways in 
which new technologies were harnessed in order to bring about radical improvements in working 
lives. The guiding values of these endeavours were a desire to improve job design and create safer, 
more humane systems, as well as promoting democracy in both workplaces and society more 
generally. They considered that a work system should be seen as a set of activities coming together 
to form an integrated whole, as opposed to a collection of separate tasks, i.e. an open system, 
interacting with an environment that influences its behaviour (Emery, 2000). Through Action 
Research projects in industry, and working with Systems Thinking (Ackoff and Emery, 1972) a set 
of principles for socio-technical design were developed (Cerns, 1976).  
These principles, and their implications for security professionals, are represented in Figure 1 and 
also set out in Table 1. An overriding theme is that analysis, preparation and implementation of a 
socio-technical design is the property of no individual or set of individuals; it belongs to the members 
of the organization whose working lives are to be designed. Thus, also, development of security 
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policies and measures must be considered a socio-technical issue, to be addressed in all areas and at 
all levels in an organization. 
 
 
Figure 1: Principles for Socio-technical Design relevant for IS Security   
Since the early years of the socio-technical movement, it has been widely recognised that capability 
is embedded in people (Nonaka, 1991; Davenport and Prusak, 2000), and it follows that an effective 
work system will be designed as a socio-technical whole, in which available technologies are 
considered in the light of the desires of those who will use them (Mohr and van Amelsvoort, 2016).  
Table 1: Principles of Socio-technical Design (adapted from Cerns, 1976). 
Socio-technical Principle Description Relationship to IS 
Security 
Compatibility The process of design must be 
compatible with the objectives to be 
achieved. 
 
IS design processes must 
incorporate consideration 





























The essential aspects of the design 
must first be established but only 
those aspects that are absolutely 
necessary must be prescribed. 
It is expected that systems 
will (co)evolve and change 
through use by engaged 
actors. Security must 




Variances, i.e. any unprogrammed 
event that can affect the outcome 
from the system, must be controlled 
as near their point of origin as 
possible. ‘Management’ is 
concerned with control of variances 
but too often is reactive – dealing 
with consequences of variance, 
rather than prevention. 
This suggests that security 
matters should be 
considered by all staff 
members, and receive 
continuous attention from 
those with relevant 
contextual knowledge of 
the system, including 




As environmental demands vary, it 
is more adaptive and less wasteful to 
design multifunctional elements in a 
work system. By combining 
elements in different ways, the same 
functions can be performed in 
different ways. Thus, work systems 
can be designed to be flexible and 
resilient. 
This requires that all staff 
should engage in security 
mindfulness from multiple 
perspectives, so that 
switching of functions does 
not facilitate breaches. 
Boundary Location Organizational boundaries are 
usually drawn to reflect one or more 
of three criteria (technology, 
territory and time). These tend to 
create barriers, interfering with 
sharing of knowledge and 
experience. In contrast, autonomous 
work groups can manage their own 
boundaries more effectively. 
Responsibility for co-ordination 
should therefore rest within such 
groups. Managers should be seen as 
a resource of such groups. 
Clearly, the inception of 
autonomous workgroups, 
with fluid boundaries in 
working systems and power 
to define these for 
themselves, could lead to a 
loss of focus on security 
and scope for breaches to 
be facilitated. Security 
awareness development 
and training are therefore 
an essential consideration. 
Information Flow Data systems should be designed to 
deliver information to the first point 
at which action is required. Too 
often, technology is harnessed to 
please budget holders rather than 
people involved in work systems. 
This principle facilitates 
good security practice 
because by encouraging its 
implementation in the 
context of actual work 
practice. 
Support Congruence Systems of social support should be 
designed so as to reinforce the 
behaviours that the organization 
structure is designed to elicit. An 
example would be reward systems. 
If group working is required, then 
individual incentives will be 
counterproductive. Systems of 
selection, training, conflict 
resolution, work measurement, 
An engaged workforce, 
focused upon achievement 
of excellence and 
appropriately rewarded 
may well be the best asset 
any organization can have 
in endeavours to promote 




timekeeping, leave allocation, 
promotion and separation can all 
reinforce or contradict the 
behaviours which are desired. 
Design and Human Values The objective of organizational 
design should be to provide a high 
quality of work for participants, e.g. 
content should be reasonably 
demanding, work-based learning 
should be supported, and individuals 
should have a certain, minimal area 
of decision making of their own, 
together with appropriate support. 
Employees who are 
motivated and enjoying job 
satisfaction are likely to 
identify with organizational 
ideals, which will include 
good security compliance. 
Incompletion Design is a reiterative process, in 
which closure of some options opens 
up new ones. As soon as design is 
implemented, its consequences will 
indicate the need for redesign, and 
the same multifunctional, multilevel 
and multidisciplinary approach 
needed for design is needed for 
evaluation, review and redesign. 
This principle emphasises a 
need to take an iterative 
perspective. All security 
policies and measures are 
by their nature contingent. 
Change in organizational 
systems and environments 
is endemic and must be 
continually matched. 
 
One well-known methodology based on ST principles is ETHICS (Mumford, 2006). The acronym 
stands for Effective Technical and Human Implementation of Computer-based Systems. This was 
developed through interaction of theory with practice in action research projects. Mumford and Wear 
(1979) detail nine such projects, ranging from work in Liverpool docks and the British coal industry 
to problems experienced in a bank and in senior management decision-making systems. What was 
clear from these interventions was the importance of participation by all those having an interest in 
the qualities of a resultant design, and a need to avoid separation of technical and social dimensions 
–these cannot simply be ‘aligned’ but are integral and indivisible from each other. During her 
lifetime, Mumford continued to develop her socio-technical thinking (Mumford, 2006). She 
recognized a need to develop methodologies that could support a holistic perspective and also 
address the impetus of change in all organizational systems (Mumford and Beekman, 1994). Others, 
such as Baxter and Sommerville (2011) and Bednar (2018) have taken up the challenge left by 
Mumford to carry this work forward. The next section contains examples showing the importance 
of socio-technical perspectives in management thinking. 
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Illustrating the need for a socio-technical approach 
Mohr (2016) discusses the nature of High Performance Organizations (HPO) and the requirements 
for their design. An HPO is one which achieves both human and business goals to a great extent, and 
is able to show resilience to disturbances by adapting to changing requirements with minimal 
disruption or cost. In an HPO, the culture of the organization, its vision for the future and its 
supporting structures are all aligned, so that the energy for high performance comes from self-
generated, individual commitment. Mohr contends that such organizations require an open, socio-
technical systems approach to design. Mohr cites an example highlighted by Pava (1983). 
The General Motors (GM) plant at Fordstown, in USA, was one of the most technologically 
advanced automotive plants in the world at the time. It was designed on Taylorist principles, for 
maximum efficiency. However, poor job conditions led to a strike. Over-optimisation of technical 
systems, and under-development of social systems by comparison, led to a watershed for GM 
management. It was recognised that there was a need to move away from traditional approaches to 
system design. It could be seen that technical systems analysis was focused upon steps, tasks and 
processes, measurement of variances and means by which these should be addressed. Social systems 
analysis, on the other hand, was focused on interactions among people, how co-ordination was to be 
achieved, and how staff were to be motivated. If these analyses are carried out separately, even if 
they are simultaneous, it seems unlikely that the results can be combined into one, homogenous and 
effective design in which all factors are optimal (Pava, 1983). This well-publicised case led to change 
in American management thinking, away from reliance on Taylorism. Commenting upon this case, 
Pava suggested that an approach called the North American Open Sociotechnical System (NAOSS) 
could address this issue. This approach combined theory with detailed procedure for design so that 
variances could be addressed as close to their source as possible, and operations could be set up on 
the basis of meaningful work tasks (as defined by employees). This would lead to situations in which 
people desired to carry out tasks, had the necessary capability to do so, and were permitted by the 




Too often, in the past, struggling companies have focused on fixing operations affecting the bottom 
line first, postponing consideration of ‘soft’ issues until later, as they are seen as less crucial. Keller 
and Schaninger (2019) have disputed the wisdom of such a view. These authors argue that more 
effective organizational design results when both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ issues are tackled at the same time 
and with equal emphasis, in a co-ordinated effort. To support this view, they cite experience at the 
CocaCola Company (Beasley and Isdell, 2011). In the early years of the 21st century, CocaCola 
suffered a downturn in shareholder value to -26%. During the same period, their greatest rivals, 
Pepsi, experienced an increase to 46%. A new CEO was appointed, who found that his predecessor 
had made great efforts to turn things around through brand development, creation of adjacent 
businesses and building of a corporate ‘wellness’ programme. All of this had been to no avail. The 
incoming CEO launched a new manifesto for growth. This set out the company’s vision, how it was 
proposed to pursue these goals and how people would work together more effectively. Crucially, this 
manifesto was developed collaboratively. A team of 150 top managers wrote it up, following 
collaboration among 400 of their colleagues, who collaborated in turn with their teams. This meant 
that the implementation of new strategies were widely ‘owned’ among company employees. 
Performance improved markedly in the period that followed. Furthermore, there was a 25% 
reduction in staff turnover, and employee engagement improved to an unprecedented degree. 
Reflecting upon this, and other examples, Keller and Schaninger developed a five frame 
performance-and-health methodology that might be used as a guide to tackling large-scale change 
(see Table 2). 
Aspire Where do we want to go? 
Assess How ready are we to go? 
Architect What must we do to get there? 
Act How do we manage the journey? 
Advance How do we continue to improve? 
Table 2: Five frames of performance and health – top level (Keller and Schaninger, 2019). 
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Each of these frames is considered in collaborative inquiry, in turn. Participants know when to move 
on to the next phase when they have answered the question posed. This will be an iterative process. 
Evidently, consideration of security will form one of the issues for work in each stage. 
A further example of the need for socio-technical approaches can be found in the rise of applications 
of Artificial Intelligence (AI). It has often been suggested that one of the benefits in using AI is the 
removal of human bias from decision-making. However, it can easily be seen that the algorithms 
underpinning AI can lead to bias being ‘baked in’ if there is insufficient critical scrutiny of algorithm 
design; or if there is inherent bias in data that AI applications draw upon or the methods by which 
this is gathered and processed. Silberg and Maryilea (2019) suggest that two opportunities present 
themselves. The first is to use AI to identify and reduce the impact of human bias. The second is the 
opportunity to improve AI systems, how they leverage data, and how they are developed and 
deployed to prevent them from perpetuating human and societal biases. The need to take up the 
second of these opportunities is highlighted by recent inquiry into the impacts of data derived from 
social media. Organizations such as Cambridge Analytica have been able to take bodies of 
anonymised data from social media interactions, find patterns in that data, and make targeted 
interventions via those media that have arguably impacted negatively upon democratic processes in 
the USA and elsewhere (Naughton, 2018). This clearly shows the indestructible link between 
technological and social factors that means they must be tackled holistically. Human imagination 
must be exercised to consider what unintended consequences can arise from use of AI, what their 
impact might be and how to prevent and combat them. 
Discussion 
All of the examples above have highlighted wide recognition that systems development is a socio-
technical matter, and that it is neither desirable nor advisable to attempt to separate social and 
technical strands. What is needed is a range of available methodologies, tools and techniques to 
support socio-technical design. It can be seen that all of the above examples are relevant for 
Information Systems security professionals to consider. Staff who are engaged and motivated, and 
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who take ownership of the objectives of their employing organization, will also be likely to be 
watchful and co-operative in protecting its interests through appropriate security measures. Their 
collaboration in design, using their contextual knowledge, is likely to lead to more effective security 
design. Consideration of socio-technical factors is vital in design of all systems, even those whose 
foundation is highly technical, such as application of AI. Engagement with staff, customers and 
wider society is necessary to design of systems that are safe and secure in use. 
However, despite wide recognition that socio-technical design improves both productivity and 
quality of work, it has not gained prominence among the available approaches to development. 
Baxter and Sommerville (2011) argue that this is due to a number of factors. The desire to create 
more humane systems that underpinned the original research may be seen by some as naïve in a 
business context. However, the main problem may relate to lack of tools to carry socio-technical 
design principles into effect, or a perception among designers trained in more reductionist 
approaches that such methodologies are difficult and time-consuming to implement. There is clearly 
a need for more work in this area to bring a much-needed, socio-technical lens to issues of IS 
development and security for the future, with an appropriate armoury of methodologies, tools and 
techniques (Sarker, et al, 2019). 
Education in socio-technical methods must be a priority, particularly for those concerned with 
information security. As the impact of artificial intelligence, robotics and cobotics in industry are 
realised, and separation between human and technological elements of work systems becomes ever 
less practical, it is likely that designers will increasingly turn to socio-technical methodologies 
(Moulières-Seban, Bitonneau, Salotti, Thibault and Claverie, 2017). 
Conclusions 
Research clearly shows that cyber-enabled industrial espionage is a growing problem. The volume 
and complexity of modern data systems, the inter-dependencies of work systems based in both 
human and artificial intelligence, and the pace of technological change, combine to make it difficult 
for designers to comprehend and anticipate all possible vulnerabilities and threats. It is clear that 
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insiders within organizations provide the weakest link in security measures, whether through choice 
to engage in nefarious practices or through inadvertent activities that facilitate a breach. Deliberate 
espionage by outsiders is known to focus on weaknesses in corporate security practice, and poorly-
designed work systems that facilitate unauthorised access.  
Concerns about espionage may also raise new issues of privacy and stress for employees. The 
temptation may be great for managers to introduce oppressive measures in the name of enhanced 
security, such as close surveillance and monitoring of performance; listening in to voice mail; 
searching of emails and computer files. Such measures are likely to be counterproductive in practice 
– any short-term gains in enhanced security will be off-set by destruction of trust, creativity and 
engagement with the culture and values of the business.  
Attempts by legislators to address espionage through regulatory frameworks have suffered from 
difficulties in interpretation and application of rules, as well as difficulties with detection and 
reporting. While there have been successful prosecutions of individuals in relation to data breaches 
that resulted in financial gain, many organizations would be reluctant to report their own 
vulnerabilities for fear of reputational damage. Smaller organizations may lack the expertise or 
resources to mount a forensic investigation of vulnerability or breach. 
Organizations would benefit from a two-way approach to information systems security: good system 
design and management practice to minimise vulnerability, coupled with appropriate detection and 
regulatory measures. Organizations of all sizes, and SMEs in particular, may benefit from adopting 
a socio-technical perspective. Such approaches can incorporate effective design of work systems to 
streamline risk management processes, involve relevant stakeholders in operational cyber-risk 
mitigation and promote a culture of security awareness. Training programmes can be designed and 
delivered to relate to actual, professional practice so as to be meaningful to stakeholders. Engagement 
and participation by professionals is needed to promote design of systems that are not only user-
friendly, but genuinely supportive of meaningful use in context. Principles for good socio-technical 
design should be considered at all stages and levels, whenever desirable change is contemplated. 
Malleability should be built into systems so that they are adaptable in use without introducing 
17 
 
unanticipated weaknesses. In this way, professionals will be supported to carry out their roles without 
needing to by-pass procedures or develop work-arounds.  
Clearly, appropriate tools and techniques for socio-technical design of secure systems will be needed. 
This highlights a requirement for continuing research into this crucial field. 
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